The present paper adds a central bank to an existing general equilibrium model with banking sector. In our model, the central bank lends reserves to commercial banks and charges its repo interest rate. We obtain the usual result of flexible price models that expansionary monetary policy has a negligible effect on real variables such as output, consumption and investment expenditure. However, the composition of total investment is significantly altered as investment by banks increases at the expense of investment by nonbank firms. This result is a consequence of our explicit modelling of the central bank repo rate.
Introduction
In modern economies, monetary policy decisions correspond to changes in the central bank repo interest rate. Yet, neither traditional macroeconomic models nor dynamic general equilibrium models have so far included this variable. Of course it can be argued that the variable is included in an implicit way because a lower repo, for example, tends to be associated with higher liquidity and lower economy interest rates. However, this paper shows that explicit modelling of the central bank repo rate produces a result in terms of the composition of investment expenditure which is absent in previous models. Leao (2003) extends the general equilibrium model of King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) to explicitly include a banking sector. Here, we add a central bank that lends reserves to commercial banks and charges its repo interest rate. Unlike Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995) , where cash injections from the central bank to the banking sector are costless lump sum transfers, in our model commercial banks have to pay interest on the amounts borrowed from the central bank.
Note that the central bank repo rate corresponds in the eurozone to the "main re…nancing rate of the European Central Bank" and has an approximate correspondence to what in the U.S. is the "target for the Federal Funds Rate".
We have log-linearized the competitive equilibrium of our model around the steady-state values of its variables and then calibrated it using Postwar U.S. data. Afterwards, we examined the response of the model to monetary policy changes and other exogenous shocks.
In our general equilibrium model with central bank, increases in liquidity by the central bank are associated with a fall in interest rates. In order to induce commercial banks to hold more liquidity, the central bank must decrease its repo rate. This, in turn, allows banks to reduce their lending rate. In the empirical literature, the papers of Strongin (1995) , Hamilton (1997) and other authors strongly support the existence of a negative relationship between liquidity and interest rates.
In our ‡exible price model, expansionary monetary policy makes the price level rise and has almost no impact on aggregate real variables such as output, consumption and total investment expenditure. However, explicit modelling of the central bank repo rate has the consequence that, unlike in previous models, expansionary monetary policy which is seen as temporary signi…cantly changes the composition of investment expenditure. Speci…cally, a decrease in the central bank repo rate makes investment expenditure by commercial banks become so attractive that signi…cant amounts of investment expenditure are switched from nonbank …rms to banking …rms. This e¤ect does not appear in papers, such as Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995) , that have included modelling of the relationship between the central bank and commercial banks.
It is important to underline that our results were obtained with a model which was built without imposing any special restrictions and calibrated with parameters which were all obtained using U.S. data.
The structure of the article is as follows. In section 2, we characterize the economic environment: preferences, technology, resource constraints, and market structure. In section 3, we describe the typical bank's behaviour and its relation with the central bank. Sections 4 and 5 deal with the typical …rm's behaviour and with the typical household's behaviour, respectively. In section 6, we write down the market clearing conditions. Section 7 includes the set of equations that describe the competitive equilibrium and section 8 reports the calibration of the model. In section 9, we look at the impact of expansionary monetary policy and other shocks -and then discuss the main results of the paper. Section 10 makes an overview and conclusion.
The Economic Environment
Our model is a closed economy model with no government. There are H homogeneous households, F homogeneous …rms, L homogeneous commercial banks, and one central bank in this economy (in this paper, we shall refer to "nonbank …rms" simply as "…rms"; likewise, we shall refer to "commercial banks" simply as "banks"). There is only one physical good produced in this economy which we denote physical output. Output can either be consumed or used for investment (i.e., used to increase the capital stock). In our model, bank loans are the only source of money to the economy. Banks make loans to households and households then use the money obtained in this way to buy consumption goods from the …rms. In performing their role of suppliers of credit, banks incur labour costs, capital costs, and interest costs. They hire people in the labour market and buy capital goods in the goods market. They also pay interest on the amount of reserves they borrow from the central bank.
We next examine the typical household's preferences, the technology available in the economy (production functions and capital accumulation equations), the resource constraints that exist in a given period, and the market structure. Let us suppose that we are at the beginning of period 0 and that households, …rms and banks are considering decisions for periods t with t = 0; 1; 2; 3; :::. The household's utility level in period t is given by u(c t ;`t), where c t denotes consumption and`t is leisure. The function u(:; :) has the usual properties. The household seeks to maximize lifetime utility given by U 0 = E 0 · t=1 P t=0¯t u(c t ;`t)¸, where¯is a discount factor (0 <¯< 1).
Each …rm's production function is described by
, where y t is the output of the …rm, A t is a technological parameter, k t is the …rm's (pre-determined) capital stock, and n d t is the …rm's labour demand: The …rm's capital accumulation equation is k t+1 = (1 ¡ ±)k t + i t , where i t is the ‡ow of investment in period t and ± is the per-period rate of depreciation of the capital stock. For each bank, there is a production function which tells how much credit in real terms the bank is able to process for each combination of work hours hired and capital stock available.
This technology, which is available to all banks, can be summarized by
where b s t is the bank's supply of credit in real terms, D t is a technological parameter, k The resource constraints that exist in this economy are as follows. Each …rm enters period t with a stock of capital, k t , which is pre-determined [which was determined at the beginning of period (t ¡ 1)]. In other words, the capital stock that will enter the production function in period t cannot be changed by decisions taken at the beginning of period t or during period t. Each bank enters period t with a capital stock, k b t , which is pre-determined. Each household has an endowment of time per period which is normalized to be equal to one by an appropriate choice of units. This endowment of time can be used to work or to rest. Therefore, we can write n
where n s t is the household's labour supply during period t:
Let us now describe the market structure. There are six markets: the goods market, the labour market, the bank loans market, the market for …rm shares, the market for bank shares, and a market where the central bank lends reserves to commercial banks. We assume that each household behaves as a price-taker, each …rm behaves as a price-taker, and each bank also behaves as a price-taker. Prices are perfectly ‡exible and adjust so as to clear all markets in every period.
In each period, the complete description of monetary ‡ows among economic agents in our model is as follows. At the beginning of the period, there are no notes and coins and no checkable deposits in the economy. Then, in the …rst instants of the period, the central bank lends reserves to banks. Banks need reserves because they must supply notes and coins through the cashmachine during the period and because they must comply with a required reserve ratio. Still at the beginning of the period, banks use the reserves to support loans to households. Each loan implies the creation of new checkable deposits (creation of money) which are a liability to the bank and an asset to the household. These checkable deposits become available at the household's bank account. Households borrow from the banks the amount that they need in order to buy consumption goods from the …rms during the period. We assume that, for institutional reasons, part of the consumption expenditure must be paid using notes and coins. As a consequence, each household asks for a certain percentage of her checkable deposits to be converted into notes and coins. During the period, households spend their notes and coins and checkable deposits buying consumption goods from the …rms. At the end of the period, households receive back from the …rms these notes and coins and checkable deposits (as wage payments and dividend payments).
Then, households pay to the banks interest on the amount borrowed at the beginning of the period. However, households immediately receive back from the banks the amount of interest they paid. They receive this amount in the following ways (see de…nition of bank pro…ts in section 3): (i) banks use part of the interest received from households to pay interest to the central bank, and the central bank then transfers the amount received to the households by means of a lumpsum transfer; (ii) another portion of the interest received by the banks is used by them to pay the physical capital they obtained from the …rms and …rms then give that amount of money to households in the form of wages and dividends; (iii) another part is received by the households in the form of wages paid by the banks; (iv) …nally, the remaining part is paid to the households in the form of bank dividends. We may summarize as follows what has happened until now in the period (note that we are already at the period's end point). The typical household borrowed from banks the amount she needed to buy consumption goods, then she spent this money buying goods, and then she received it back from the …rms as wages and dividends. Afterwards, she used part of this amount to pay interest to banks but then received it back according to (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). So, at the moment, the household again possesses the principal she borrowed at the beginning of the period (the value of consumption) which she naturally uses now to repay the bank loan. As a consequence, the household is left with no money -the same situation she was in at the beginning of the period. Note that the household makes the payment to the bank partly using the notes and coins she had withdrawn through the cash-machine partly by debit of her checkable deposits account (by destroying the checkable deposits she has in her account).
Let us now see the position banks are in at the moment. They have received back the notes and coins supplied and we also know that, since households are left with no money, banks now have zero checkable deposits on the liabilities side of their balance sheet. This means they no longer need to hold required reserves. Therefore, banks now have available exactly the amount they had borrowed from the central bank at the beginning of the period and they use this amount to repay that loan. The conclusion to be drawn is that, after all these payments, each commercial bank is left with no reserves and each household is left with zero money balances. Hence, at the start of the next period, each bank must again borrow reserves from the central bank and each household must again borrow from commercial banks. Therefore, the pattern of payments will be repeated in the next period and in every period ahead.
The Central Bank and the Behaviour of the Typical Commercial Bank
Compared to the model of Leao (2003) , the model of the present paper has one extra market:
the market where the central bank lends reserves to commercial banks and charges the repo rate.
Reserves lent are credited into the account that each commercial bank has at the central bank.
Commercial banks then use these reserves to support their loans to the private sector. 
This is the amount of reserves that will be demanded by each bank when it goes to the openmarket operation that occurs at the beginning of the period.
In period t, the nominal pro…ts of each bank are given by: interest income minus interest expense (interest paid to the central bank on the amount of reserves borrowed) minus wage payments to the bank's employees minus investment in physical capital made by the bank
where R t is the interest rate charged by the bank for loans that start at the beginning of period t and end at the beginning of period (t +1), R repo t is the interest rate charged by the central bank, W t is the nominal wage rate, and P t is the price of physical output. We assume that the bank pays wages at the end of the period. The pro…ts earned by each bank during period t are distributed to households (the shareholders) at the end of the period in the form of dividends. The previous equation can be rewritten as
Using equation (1), this last equation becomes
Each bank maximizes the Value of its Assets (VA), i.e., the expected discounted value of its stream of present and future dividends. Therefore, when we are at the beginning of period 0, the typical bank's optimization problem is
is given by (3) . Given the economic environment we are working with, we think it is appropriate to assume that
. Note that we are at the beginning of period 0. Therefore, because dividends are only distributed at the end of the period, we discount period 0 dividends by multiplying them by 1=(1 +R 0 ), we discount period
, and so on.
The Typical Firm's Behaviour
In nominal terms, the pro…ts of …rm f in period t are given by: income from the sale of output minus the wage bill minus investment expenditure
The …rm pays wages to households at the end of the period. The pro…ts earned by each …rm during period t are distributed to households (the shareholders) at the end of the period in the form of dividends. Each …rm maximizes the Value of its Assets (VA). Therefore, when we are at the beginning of period 0; the typical …rm's optimization problem is
here ¦ f t is given by (4).
The Typical Household's Behaviour
The way bank loans work in this model is as follows. We have mentioned that R t denotes the interest rate between the beginning of period t and the beginning of period (t+1). At the beginning of period t, the household borrows from banks the amount
. This means that the household receives Bt+1 1+Rt monetary units at the beginning of period t and that she will have to pay is the percentage of bank l that the household buys at the beginning of period t.
In the real world, the interest earned by the central bank by lending to commercial banks is used for many purposes, including …nancing economic research. In this model, we assume that the interest income of the central bank is transferred to households at the end of the period by means of a lump-sum transfer.
In nominal terms, the typical household's budget constraint for period t is as follows
This equation simply states that the total amount of money the household has at the beginning of period t [wage earnings, dividend earnings from …rms, money received from selling the shares of …rms bought at the beginning of period (t-1), dividend earnings from banks, money received from selling the shares of banks bought at the beginning of period (t-1), the amount she borrows from the banks at the beginning of period t, and the lump-sum transfer received from the central bank] must be equal to the amount the household spends at the beginning or during period t [payment of the debt contracted from banks at the beginning of period (t-1), consumption expenditure during period t, purchase of shares of …rms at the beginning of period t, and purchase of shares of banks at the beginning of period t]. In section 5 of Leao (2003) it is possible to see how this budget constraint can be derived from the combination of a portfolio allocation constraint and a cash-inadvance constraint [using the approach of Lucas (1982) ]. Let us now normalize the household's budget constraint (equation 5). We can do this by dividing both sides of the constraint by P t , rearranging, and then de…ning the following new variables:
, and 1 +p t+1 = Pt+1 P t
. We obtain
We use the following initial condition concerning the household's debt position at the beginning of period 0
This initial condition simply states that the household begins period 0 with a debt which equals the sum of the wage earnings she receives at the beginning of period 0, dividend earnings from …rms she receives at the beginning of period 0, dividend earnings from banks she receives at the beginning of period 0, and lump-sum transfer form the central bank she receives at the beginning of period 0. She receives these amounts because of the hours she worked during period (¡1), because of the shares of …rms and of banks she bought at the beginning of period (¡1), and because of the central bank transfer. Note that period 0 is not the period where the household's life starts but rather the period where our analysis of the economy begins (the household has been living for some periods and we catch her in period 0 and try to model her behaviour). In the Appendix, we show that this initial condition is the initial condition that naturally arises when we think back to the initial moment of a closed economy without government and where …rms don't borrow. This initial condition (equation 7) can also be normalized by dividing both sides by P 0
Consequently, at the beginning of period 0, the household is looking into the future and
u(c t ;`t)¸subject to (6), (8) ], a standard transversality condition on the pattern of borrowing, and non-negativity constraints.
The Market Clearing Conditions
With H homogeneous households, F homogeneous …rms and L homogeneous banks, the market clearing conditions for period t are as follows. In the goods market, the condition is Hc t + F i t + Li b t = F y t . In the labour market, the condition is Hn Note that this market clearing condition in the reserves market embodies the idea of a money multiplier. In fact, it can be rewritten as
LB s t is the amount of credit supplied by the L banks and, because the only source of money in this economy is bank loans, it also corresponds to the money supply of this economy. Therefore, equation (9) means that the money supply of this economy is equal to a multiple of the amount of reserves supplied by the central bank.
The Competitive Equilibrium
To obtain the system that describes the competitive equilibrium, we have put together in a system the typical household's …rst order conditions, the typical …rm's …rst order conditions, the typical bank's …rst order conditions, and the market clearing conditions. We then assumed Rational
Expectations. After all these steps, and if we also assume that the production function of each …rm is homogeneous of degree one and de…ne the following new variables
, and
we can write the system describing the Competitive Equilibrium with H homogeneous households, F homogeneous …rms and L homogeneous banks plus Rational Expectations as
for t = 0; 1; 2; 3; :::
Equations 10-15 have their origin in the typical household's …rst order conditions. Equation (15) is the credit-in-advance constraint which results from combining the household's budget constraint with the household's initial debt condition and then using the market clearing conditions from the shares' market. In the appendix of Leao (2003) , it is possible to see how this credit-inadvance constraint appears in period 0 and how, under Rational Expectations, it is propagated into future periods. Equations (16) 
¢ ® and u(c t ;`t) = ln c t + Á ln`t.
Calibration
In order to study the dynamic properties of the model, we have log-linearized each of the equations in the system 10-28 around the steady-state values of the variables we have in that system of equations. The log-linearized system was then calibrated with the following parameters. With the speci…c utility function we are using, we obtain Elasticity of the MU of consumption with respect to consumption - Household's discount factor (¯) 0.993
Per-quarter rate of depreciation of the …rm's capital stock (±) 0.0047
Per-quarter rate of depreciation of the bank's capital stock (± B ) 0.0012
The simulation results we present below are robust to changes in the parameters. In other words, the qualitative nature of our results does not change when we make reasonable modi…cations in the parameters.
Response of the Model to Exogenous Shocks
The response of the log-linearized model to shocks in the exogenous variables (A t , D t , RES t , µ t and r req t ) can be obtained using the King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) method, which is based on Blanchard and Khan (1980) . We start by looking at the impact of shocks in the …rms' technological parameter (A t ), the standard RBC exercise, just to make sure the model is capable of reproducing the usual RBC results. We then look at the impact of shocks in the banks' technological parameter (D t ) in order to con…rm that the results of Leao (2003) are preserved with our extension of his model. Then, we turn to the main focus of the paper by examining the response of the model to an increase in central bank liquidity (increase in RES t ). Finally, we look at the response of the model to shocks in the currency ratio (µ t ) and in the required reserve ratio (r req t ). Note that, in all …gures of this paper, 0.01 on the vertical axis corresponds to 1%.
Technological innovations in …rms
As can be seen in …gures 1 to 8, our model reproduces the key results obtained by the RBC model of King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) . First, consumption, investment and work hours are procyclical. Second, consumption is less volatile than output and investment is more volatile than output. To perform these exercises, we made the usual assumption in the literature that the …rms technological parameter evolves according toÂ t = 0:9Â t¡1 +" t , whereÂ t denotes the % deviation of A t from its steady-state value, and " t is a white noise.
Technological innovations in banks
In …gures 9 to 16, we con…rm that our model approximately reproduces the results of Leao (2003) .
Note that …gures 9 to 16 in the present paper correspond to …gures 13, 14, 15, 22, 18, 17, 23 and 24 in Leao (2003) , respectively. In terms of the response of consumption, note that although the shapes of …gure 10 in the present paper and …gure 14 in Leao (2003) are slightly di¤erent, the actual value is similar in meaning. To perform these exercises we assumed, like Leao (2003) , that the banks technological parameter evolves according to b D t = 0:9 b D t¡1 + ' t , where b D t denotes the % deviation of D t from its steady-state value, and ' t is a white noise.
Monetary policy
We should start by mentioning that if the central bank performs a 1% increase in reserves which is perceived by all economic agents as a permanent increase, then the price level increases by 1% and there is no impact whatsoever on the real variables of the model. In particular, the composition of investment expenditure does not change in the case of a permanent increase in liquidity. and real wage (although the …gures show some e¤ect, when we look at the numbers on the vertical axis we conclude the e¤ect is very small which means the impact is almost nil). Figure 23 shows the real interest rate itself, not its deviation from steady state, and we can see that the e¤ect on this variable is also very small. In …gure 24 we can see that the 1% increase in reserves makes the price level rise by almost 1%. In …gures 25 and 26, we see that interest rates fall sharply following the increase in central bank reserves, the impact being specially strong in the case of the repo rate. This means that, in order to persuade banks to hold more liquidity, the central bank must lower its repo rate (…gure 25). This lower repo -lower cost of obtaining liquidity from the central bank -allows commercial banks to decrease their lending rate (…gure 26). We may rationalize as follows. The fact that it has become cheaper to obtain loans from commercial banks leads to higher levels of borrowing by the households and, consequently, households have more money to buy goods from …rms. As is usual in models without price rigidities, this higher demand for goods makes prices go up (…gure 24) and the impact on real output is insigni…cant (…gure 17).
The negative relationship between liquidity and interest rates, shown in …gures 25 and 26, corresponds to the results obtained in the empirical literature. Two important empirical studies on this subject are Strongin (1995) and Hamilton (1997) . Using U.S. data, Strongin (1995) …nds that an increase in liquidity has a strong and persistent negative e¤ect on interest rates. Using daily data, Hamilton (1997) also concludes that more liquidity puts downward pressure on interest rates.
In …gures 27 and 28 we have the main …nding of the paper: the composition of investment expenditure is signi…cantly changed with investment by banks rising at the expense of investment by nonbank …rms (total investment expenditure remains roughly the same as can be seen in …gure 19). Our interpretation of this result is as follows. As can be seen in equation (19), the fall in the repo rate increases the value of the marginal product of capital in banks and, because this is a temporary opportunity, banks decide to increase investment very strongly. In other words, the temporary fall in the cost of obtaining liquidity from the central bank makes investment expenditure by banks become so attractive that it is in the interest of the shareholders, the households who in this model own both the banks and the …rms, to temporarily slow investment in …rms to just below replacement levels (see …gure 32) in order to allow a strong increase in commercial bank investment expenditure. Note that because the banking industry is very small (see section 8), the 58% increase in investment by banks only requires a 1.2% drop in investment by nonbank …rms. The proof that it is the temporary nature of the increase in reserves that is decisive for the change in the composition of investment expenditure is that, as already mentioned, when the increase in reserves is seen as permanent the composition of investment does not change. 
Shocks in the currency ratio
Figures 33 to 40 show the impact of a 1% shock in µ t , the ratio (currency in circulation/total money supply). To perform these exercises, we assumed that µ t evolves according to a stochastic process analogous in form to the one used for A t and D t . Note that we again have a signi…cant impact on the composition of investment expenditure (…gures 37 and 38), in this case with a fall in the weight of bank investment. The explanation for this result is the fact that an increase in µ t decreases the value of the marginal product of capital in banks (see equation 19).
Changes in the required reserve ratio
In …gures 41 to 48, we have the e¤ect of a 1% shock in the required reserve ratio (r req t ). To perform these exercises, we assumed that r Before turning to the concluding section of the article, we would like to emphasize that all our results were obtained with a model which was built without imposing any special restrictions and calibrated with parameters which were all obtained using U.S. data. It is also worth pointing out that by adding a bank reserves market to the model of Leao (2003) , we obtained price level determinacy (which did not exist in his model). In other words, this paper shows that taking consideration of the bank reserves market is enough to create a nominal dimension in his model.
Conclusion
This paper represents a …rst attempt at modelling the central bank repo interest rate in a general equilibrium setup. We have arrived at a simple model which yet contains the main ingredients of a monetary system: (i) a reserves market where the central bank lends reserves to commercial banks; (ii) a bank loans market where commercial banks make loans to nonbank economic agents thereby creating money.
In our model, increases in liquidity by the central bank which are seen as temporary lead to a fall in interest rates. This result, which has been di¢cult to replicate in general equilibrium models, is in accordance with the …ndings of the empirical literature.
In the model we have built, when lower interest rates lead to an increase in bank lending, the higher purchasing power of consumers makes prices go up and real output is almost una¤ected.
Other real aggregates, such as the total amount of consumption expenditure and the total amount of investment expenditure, are also almost una¤ected by monetary policy changes, a result which is common in ‡exible price models. However, we …nd that monetary policy has a non-negligible e¤ect on the composition of investment expenditure in our model. In particular, expansionary monetary policy which is seen as temporary favours an increase in the weight of commercial banks investment expenditure in total investment expenditure.
Our theoretical framework implies that monetary policy changes which are seen as temporary create a strong incentive for investment expenditure by banks and, in our model calibrated with U.S. data, this happens at the expense of nonbank …rms investment. We think these …ndings point to the need for further research on at least two directions.
First, as usual in the literature, our short empirical study used simple correlations to obtain some indication about the impact of monetary policy on bank and nonbank investment expenditure in the U.S. economy. We think the results obtained with our theoretical model suggest it would be important to carry out a more profound econometric study concerning the impact of monetary policy on the composition of investment expenditure. In particular, this study should control for other in ‡uences on investment, besides monetary policy, within a multivariate modelling framework.
Second, in the class of models to which our model belongs, the way investment expenditure is modelled is still rudimentary. In particular, using the market clearing condition in the goods market and taking into account that …rms are all alike in the model, it is possible to show that the output of each …rm is equal to its own investment plus bank investment per …rm plus consumption per …rm. This implies that the investment expenditure of each …rm is equal to a certain percentage of its own output. Since the only physical good in the model is the output of the …rms (which can either be consumed or used for investment), we conclude that the investment expenditure of each …rm corresponds to the …rm using part of its own output to build capital. As a consequence, it does not make much sense in these models to have …rm investment …nanced by loans. Therefore, one di¢cult but important research avenue involves modelling …rm heterogeneity in a way that may create in some …rms the need to borrow to …nance investment -and then see if our simulation results are preserved in this improved setup.
APPENDIX
(Not for publication if the article is considered too long; in this case, there would be a note in the main text saying that this appendix is available on request from the authors)
In this Appendix, we show that the initial condition we used in the main text (equation 7) is the initial condition which naturally arises when we think back to its initial moment a closed economy without government and where …rms don't borrow. We argue that when we start our analysis of the economy at a certain point in time that is in the middle of History (let us denote this point by period 0), the speci…c initial condition (concerning the household's debt position at the beginning of period 0) that we ought to use is the initial condition we have used in this article.
Let us consider an economy where there are households, …rms, banks and one central bank, and where …rms don't borrow. Let us imagine that we are at the moment in time where serious economic activity is going to begin and denote this "Beginning of the economy" period by t B .
Since production is only going to take place during period t B , …rms will only receive income from the sales of the …nal good during period t B and hence will only pay wages and dividends at the end of period t B . However, in order to be able to buy consumption goods from the …rms during period t B households must use money. The only possibility they have to obtain this money at the beginning of period t B is to obtain a loan from a bank. Hence, when the household is at the beginning of period t B , and considering choices for t B and future periods, she faces the following set of budget constraints. For period t B the budget constraint is
This budget constraint for period t B simply states that, at the beginning of period t B , the household must borrow from the banks an amount enough to …nance her consumption expenditure during period t B and to …nance her net purchase of shares of …rms and of shares of banks.
Since the household is looking into the future, when she is at the beginning of period t B she also takes into account the budget constraints for periods (t B + 1); (t B + 2); (t B + 3); ::: which are given by
These budget constraints for periods (t B +1); (t B +2); (t B +3); ::: are identical to the household's budget constraints examined in section 5 of the article and can be explained in the same way.
Note that when the household is at the beginning of period t B , the budget constraint for t B is di¤erent from the budget constraints for the following periods (this happens because at t B there is no previous period).
In order to derive the initial condition, let us start by writing again equation 29 (the budget constraint for period t B ) Using the market clearing condition in the goods market, we obtain
Using the de…nition of nominal pro…ts of …rm f in period t B , we obtain
With the market clearing condition in the labour market, this becomes
Using the market clearing condition from the bank loans market, we obtain
Rearranging, we obtain (and so on and so forth for all periods ahead). The conclusion to be drawn is that, when we start our analysis of the economy in the middle of History (in period 0, for example), we should add to the household's optimization problem the following initial condition
This is exactly the initial condition we have used in this paper for the household's problem (equation 7). This initial condition was derived by thinking back to its initial moment a closed economy without government and where …rms don't borrow. If instead we think back to its initial moment a closed economy without government where …rms borrow the wages at the beginning of the period (in order to be able to pay wages in advance at the beginning of the period, before production has taken place), then the initial condition we obtain is B 0 = 
